Undergraduate Review
Volume 10

Article 30

2014

Adam Smith - Providing Morality in a Free Market
Economy
Kendra Tully

Follow this and additional works at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev
Part of the Political Science Commons
Recommended Citation
Tully, Kendra (2014). Adam Smith - Providing Morality in a Free Market Economy. Undergraduate Review, 10, 155-162.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev/vol10/iss1/30

This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
Copyright © 2014 Kendra Tully

Adam Smith – Providing Morality
in a Free Market Economy
Kendra Tully

Kendra Tully is a
graduating senior
majoring in Economics
and Political Science,
with a minor in
Philosophy. This research, part of a
larger Honors Thesis, was conducted
under the direction of Dr. Jordon
Barkalow (Political Science) and
supported with funding from a 2013
Adrian Tinsley Summer Research
Grant. She will present this research
at the 2014 Midwest Political Science
Association conference in Chicago, IL.
Kendra plans to pursue Ph.D. program
in Political Science, where she hopes
to continue her research and develop
her teaching abilities.

A

dam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and Wealth
of Nations (WN) appear to suffer from an irresolvable tension: TMS extols human sympathy whereas WN extols the consequences of self-interest. This paper takes a comprehensive approach, adding to scholarship on what has become known as the “Adam
Smith Problem.” Through a textual analysis of TMS and WN that focuses
on prudence, the nature of happiness and Smith’s rhetorical style, the inconsistency between his two texts disappears. The emphasis Smith places on
prudence in WN can only be properly understood when one considers its
foundations in sympathy found in TMS. By demonstrating the integral
connection between morality and markets, Smith provides his reader with
the means to critique educators, economists, and skeptics of capitalism.
When Adam Smith completed his two greatest texts, he could not have foreseen that scholars would later name the “Adam Smith problem” after an apparent inconsistency in his work. Yet the “Adam Smith problem” persists,
which comes about from a tension between his moral theory based on sympathy, laid out in Theory of Moral Sentiments, and his economic theory based
on self-interest, laid out in Wealth of Nations (hereafter, mentioned as TMS
and WN). Sympathy and self-interest are at odds, as one is other-regarding
and the other is self-regarding. Analyzing the connecting virtue of prudence
dispenses with this tension and then leaves room to explore broader connections that can be made between his two texts, such as Smith’s idea of happiness (which is realized through prudence) and his style of rhetoric. Some of
Smith’s technical economic reading can be tedious, but when employing historical or situational examples he encourages his audience to make moral as
well as economic and political evaluations. One example in particular showcases the importance he places on morality: the characters of the agricultural
versus manufacturing man. Drawing these conclusions about the relationship
between these two texts shows that Smith is, in fact, very consistent and even
more comprehensive in his works than previously thought. If then economics
has lost its way by portraying economic actors as strictly utility maximizers,
a reading of the two texts in this light brings a more robust understanding of
human economic and social behavior.
In reconciling Smith’s economic, political, and moral thought more generally, scholars use four different approaches: the political, economic, “prin-
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ciples,” and moral solution. The political approach argues that
the moral and economic realms function if society understands
the proper role of government and the correct interpretation of
justice (Cohen 1989, Lieberman 2006, Long 2006, Danford
1980). The economic solution suggests that only when economics is properly ordered do the problems with politics and
morality disappear (Alvey 1998, Grampp 2000). The “principles” solution is somewhat reductionist, in that it suggests
Smith’s economic, political, and moral realms are governed by
one overarching principle(s) (Mehta 2006). The “moral” solution emphasizes the importance of first understanding morality, which provides the base on which politics and economics
function (Hanley 2009, Griswold 1999). Studying TMS and
WN, while it does not encompass all of his works, nevertheless
allows for some preliminary conclusions about the centrality of
morality in Smith’s thought.
Prudence
In critical analysis of a text, one cannot deny fact, and the fact
is that self-interest is the basis for individual economic behavior
in WN. However, self-interest is framed as prudence, which is a
virtue only rightly understood by also examining TMS. Without moral context, there is no way to connect prudence with
sympathy, which is the basis for all morality in TMS. First, it
will be helpful to explore self-interest in WN to understand
why Smith believes it to be the driver of progress, and then
to ground his understanding of prudence in his moral theory.
Smith believes that self-interest is an inherent quality in man,
which realizes itself in economic behavior by man’s tendency to
“truck, barter, and exchange” for their mutual advantage (WN
I.ii.1).1 A man could produce all the means of his own subsistence; he could cut his own timber to build his own house,
he could grow all his crops, butcher his own meat, and sew
his own clothes, but men realize the ease that can be obtained
by relying on others for the production of these things (WN
IV.ii.11). Smith recognizes that it is easier for one man to buy
or trade for all the conveniences of life than attempt to create
and provide them all himself, thus, he employs himself in some
other way, which is not only more advantageous to himself,
but to society as well (WN I.ii.3). Improvements and increases
in productivity are caused by the division of labor and the increase of specialization (WN I.i.1, 6). Some of these improvements are the introduction of money as a means of exchange
(WN I.iv), as well as the introduction of the manufacturing
sector. Manufacturing is what moves society from the agricultural stage to the commercial stage, “when by the improvement
and cultivation of land the labour of one family can provide
food for two, the labour of half the society become sufficient
to provide food for the whole. The other half, therefore… can
be employed in providing… the other wants and fancies of
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mankind” (WN I.xi.c.7).2 The division of labor is not a chosen outcome, but an unintended consequence of that original
principle in human nature to be self-interested, and leads to
the industrialization and progress of society.
Although self-interest is an inherent quality in man, Smith
characterizes it as “prudence” and not selfishness, and there
are lesser virtues of prudence which become apparent in commercial society. Prudence rightly understood requires frugality, industry, and foresight (WN I.x.b.38, see also WN II.ii.36,
II.iii.16). An examination of the accumulation of stock versus
capital best exemplifies these lesser virtues. Division of labor
allows each man to establish his own trade, but he cannot do
so without some accumulation of stock, or capital (WN II.4).
Smith says that the general tone of society as productive or lazy
will be set by the proportion between capital and revenue (WN
II.iii.13). As capital is put to use in the manufacturing and
production of goods and revenue is not put to any productive
use at all, capital tends toward industry and the other breeds
idleness, and this outcome is set by the choices of the individuals in that society. Smith agrees that while some will give in to
the violent “passion for present enjoyment,” most will choose
to save, based on the “desire of bettering our condition, a desire
which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us
from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave”
(WN II.iii.28). The accumulation of capital requires the frugality to save, the industry to put what has been saved to use,
and the foresight to know best how to direct that capital once
it is in use. The accumulation of capital then, just as with the
division of labor, adds to the productivity and improvement of
society. However, just as in the case with the division of labor, it
is not by conscious choice to improve society that men exercise
frugality and industry but from a regard to their own wellbeing. It is Smith’s “invisible hand” concept that explains how
these private interests to augment capital lead to the overall
promulgation of domestic business. He writes:
every individual is continually exerting himself to find
out the most advantageous employment for whatever
capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view.
But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather
necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which
is most advantageous to the society. (WN IV.ii.4).
However, to prove that economic self-interest has many positive unintended consequences to society is not to deny that it
is still self-interest, which could either mean that all economic
behavior is selfish, or that “bettering our condition” means economic actors base their actions on sympathy.
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Smith clearly denies that economic behavior originates from
selfishness, as he specifically states that commerce between individuals should be based on “a bond of union and friendship”
(WN IV.iii.c.9). The other option then is to revisit Smith’s TMS
to answer the question; is self-interest based on sympathy? Selfinterest in both TMS and WN is referred to as “prudence,”
which is the general care an individual takes to the maintenance of their health, fortune, rank and reputation (TMS
VI.i.5). An individual’s health is easy enough to maintain, as it
requires a proper course of diet and exercise. A person’s fortune
is dependent on those lesser virtues of industry and frugality
which are explicitly made reference to in TMS (TMS VI.i.11).
It is an individual’s rank and reputation which “depend very
much upon what… our character and conduct, or upon the
confidence, esteem, and good-will, which these naturally excite
in the people we live with” (TMS VI.i.4). A man who pursues
fortune in order to distinguish himself among the ranks of men
does so in a particular way, following all the “established decorums and ceremonials of society” (TMS VI.i.10). It is only at
that point at which he has earned the respect and approbation
of others which Smith believes to be the “strongest of all our
desires” (TMS VI.i.4, emphasis added). Accordingly, feelings
of approbation come when an individual displays propriety in
their action and an adherence to the general rules of society.
These rules are “ultimately founded upon experience of what,
in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of
merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of ” (TMS III.4.8).
How are feelings of propriety and merit established? By the
use of sympathy; sympathy for Smith is not akin to empathy.
Instead it is a mode by which one may enter into another’s
situation, and in doing so exercise their moral sentiments in
order to best make moral evaluations about the other’s behavior. When the sentiments of two individuals are in concord,
approbation follows (TMS I.i.3.1). Thus, self-interest in WN
gains a moral foundation when connected to the virtue of prudence in TMS. The tension between self-interest and sympathy dissolves when one realizes that prudence is grounded on
sympathy, in the sense that an individual’s prudent behavior is
in accordance with “propriety,” which originates from the use
of sympathy which forms social standards based on society’s
moral evaluations.
Smith demonstrates that prudent behavior occasions moral
approbation and respect. Man’s economic transactions therefore define his character, or at least who one wants the world
to see, and men seem to engage in economic evaluation just
as they engage in moral evaluation. For example, throughout
WN Smith gives the fullest support for freedom of occupation.
This can be seen from his extended critique of apprenticeships,
which constrain and confine the individual in their preference
of profession (WN I.x.c.12-16). Could this be because he supBridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

ports the most liberal society? Perhaps, but it also suggests on
a deeper level a commitment to allowing for moral self-actualization. Smith observes that a man’s labor is an extension of
himself: “the patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and
dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this
strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper… is a
plain violation of [his] most sacred property” (WN I.x.c.12).
Only by providing for the freedom of choice does Smith allow
men to better their condition on their own terms. A person’s
choice of career, the sole means which one proposes to support
themselves, seems to be the greatest economic choice of all, but
how does one choose? Most men choose a profession which
affords the greatest “publick admiration,” for “what are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose of human life
which we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be
attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency,
and approbation” (WN I.x.b.24, TMS I.iii.2.1). A man who
prudently enters into any profession, and prudently conducts
his business therefore receives all the attention and moral approbation he requires. The sole motivation behind every individual’s desire to become the object of this sympathy and
approval is happiness. Therefore, prudence, a regard to one’s
own station and choices in life, gives him the means to find
happiness.
What does happiness mean for Smith? There are a few ways
in which happiness is meant, but in all it means a sense of
“tranquility” (TMS VI.i.12, see also TMS III.3.31). In the first
way, happiness is economic achievement. Smith describes a
man who has lived by the economic principles of frugality and
industry and finally reaches a point at which “he is enabled
gradually to relax, both in the rigour of his parsimony and in
the severity of his application; and he feels with double satisfaction this gradual increase of ease and enjoyment, from having
felt before the hardship which attended to the want of them”
(TMS VI.i.12). It is at this point at which all of his lifetime
struggles are met with a just amount of reward and leisure.
Griswold (1999, 218) characterizes Smith’s sense of happiness
as being first consisting “in one’s being at rest in the sense of
lacking significant discord; it is peaceful, at a deep level. Second, happiness is more like coming to a stop than like a process
of moving toward a goal.” In the second way, Smith’s happiness
seems to be a sort of internal equilibrium, between how one
wants and feels he deserves to be perceived by others and how
others actually perceive him. Smith recognizes that happiness
is absence of guilt and shame, and “…the chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of being beloved”
(TMS I.ii.5.2). This love, however, to be satisfactory, needs
to be deserved. A man earns self-approbation from being the
object of praise-worthiness and not simply praise (TMS III.2).
Thus, happiness occurs when a man does not want to alter
either his condition, or his character.
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However lovely this portrayal of happiness may sound, the
great irony for Smith is that men will never achieve it. Directly after Smith asserts man’s desire to “better our condition,”
which “comes from us from the womb,” he states: “In the
whole interval which separates these two moments [life and
death], there is scarce perhaps a single instant in which any
man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his situation,
as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of any
kind” (WN II.iii.28). The causes of this deviation are found
both in WN and TMS. In WN, Smith recognizes that individuals want to appear as if they are doing well for themselves; that
they are smart, hard-working, etc. As society places a monetary
value on those items which are scarce and most valued, these
become the objects which most believe will occasion them the
most attention; “with the greater part of rich people, the chief
enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which in
their eyes is never so compleat as when they appear to possess
those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can possess but
themselves” (WN I.xi.c.31). Thus, “an augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and
wish to better their condition” (WN II.iii.28). In TMS, Smith
states, “…the pleasures of vanity and superiority are seldom
consistent with perfect tranquility, the principle and foundation of all real and satisfactory enjoyment” (TMS III.3.31).
For Smith, those that deem themselves praise-worthy are no
longer seeking praise from others. There is an internal moral
evaluation that is sufficient enough to satisfy them. Thus, it is
a perversion of the imagination and a “corruption of our moral
sentiments” which makes the situation of the rich more attractive than the poor (TMS I.iii.2.2, I.iii.3.1). For, “a rich man
glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw
upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are
disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions
with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire
him” (TMS I.iii.2.1). The situation is thus a spiteful paradox;
men may believe accumulating wealth will make them happy,
but while striving for happiness they actually move farther
away from it and closer to societal economic prosperity. Smith
ardently believes “it is well that nature imposes upon us in this
manner. It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind” (TMS IV.i.1.9). By
the innate desire to “better our condition” and a perversion of
the imagination, men are never happy because economic activity means men are never at rest, and always striving, and if ever
attaining happiness, only doing so for a short amount of time.
The example of the “poor man’s son” best exemplifies this paradox (TMS IV.i.8). A poor man’s son is born with the ambition
to become rich, believing a palace, servants, and conveniences
to be the best means of happiness. Thus, he spends his entire
life in hard labor, working for men he hates and perfecting his
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manners. Finally, “in the last dregs of life” he finds that “wealth
and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility,” which are
more trouble in attaining than they will ever be in enjoying
(TMS IV.i.8). Although this man is industrious, and contributes much to society, from his greed and vanity he never attains
happiness. This means of acquiring fortune does not seem to
be in accordance with the prudence grounded on sympathy
and virtue stated above. In the following example from WN,
it becomes clear that however deep vanity might corrupt; it is
the prudent and not the greedy who win in the end and who
Smith supports. In addition, it demonstrates Smith’s concern
over not only political and economic consequences, but moral
consequences as well.
The Moral Rhetoric of Wealth of Nations
Understanding Smith’s style of rhetoric is essential to unlocking the ends and teachings of his works. Smith differs from
other modern philosophers in that he does not, in most cases,
adopt a high-handed tone, but instead employs common life
and literary examples addressed in the first and second person.
As one example among innumerable in TMS, Smith talks of
how men naturally sympathize with only “great sorrows,” and
proceeds to demonstrate why this is true by asking the reader
to take a journey of perhaps a decade within the confines of
their imagination:
If you labour, therefore, under any signal calamity, if
by some extraordinary misfortune you are fallen into
poverty, into diseases, into disgrace and disappointment; even though your own fault may have been,
in part, the occasion, yet you may generally depend
upon the sincerest sympathy of all your friends… But
if your misfortune is not of this dreadful kind, if you
have only been a little baulked in your ambition, if
you have only been jilted by your mistress, or are only
hen-pecked by your wife, lay your account with the
raillery of all your acquaintance. (TMS I.ii.5.4)
It seems only fit to quote the entire passage so as to convey
Smith’s ability to captivate the reader. Smith in addition uses
common place examples and experiences in WN. In the opening pages of WN, Smith utilizes many examples to demonstrate
the advantages and effects of the division of labor, in each case
specifically calling on the reader to “imagine it” so as best to
understand (WN I.i.1-11). Smith has two motives for writing
this way: to familiarize and engage the reader, which in turn
serves a pedagogical purpose in exercising the reader’s moral
sentiments.
Smith often writes in the first person “I” or second person “we”
to generate a sense of commonality and fondness, a “we are
BridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

all in this together” sort of spirit. This not only allows Smith
to make his works attractive to the average layperson, but also
to uphold his principles about the discipline of philosophy as
well.3 Smith believes that “philosophers in particular are apt
to cultivate with a particular fondness, as the great means of
displaying their ingenuity, the propensity to account for all appearances from as few principles as possible” (TMS VII.ii.2.14).
This proclivity to turn philosophy into a “system,” Smith argues, is impossible and dangerous, as a few principles cannot
possibly account for all “the different shades and gradations of
circumstance, character, and situation” (TMS VI.ii.2.1). The
conversational use of “we” and “I,” and the commonplace examples seen throughout his work allow Smith to preserve the
user-friendly feel of his moral system based on imagination and
sympathy. In addition, it keeps readers from being scared away
by perhaps too much philosophy. Smith recognizes that “a written philosophical work runs particular risks of encouraging an
‘academic’ detachment from ordinary life and of reducing ethical debate to a merely theoretical, perhaps casuistical, enterprise” (Griswold 1999, 62). Far from making him simple just
because he is clear, Smith’s rhetorical style reveals his desire to
convey extremely complicated ideas in the most approachable
way possible.
Smith’s pedagogical motives behind his rhetorical style are
also twofold: he wishes to encourage individuals to become
better moral critics, to in turn then foster propriety in their
own actions. According to his moral there, there is a desire for
man’s imagination to fill in the gaps before engaging in a serious moral evaluation. Therefore, by way of examples, Smith
provides the context which the imagination yearns for in order
to help facilitate the function of sympathy in the reader. Fleischacker (2004, 12-13) explains that “…since [Smith] understands sympathy as an act of the imagination, rather than of
the senses alone, imaginative writing can quite directly enliven
or enrich our capacity for moral judgment.” The exercise of the
moral sentiments then creates an opportunity for men to become better moral critics, as “criticism is an intrinsically pedagogic activity” (Griswold 1999, 65). The second component to
Smith’s pedagogical reasons for his style of rhetoric is that once
the reader develops their capacity for moral criticism, they will
then use this to inform their own sense of propriety. Griswold
(1999, 49) terms Smith’s use of the second person in TMS as
the “protreptic ‘we’:” “the pronoun is ‘protreptic’ in that it is
intended to persuade us to view things in a certain light, to
refine the ways in which we judge and feel, and perhaps to encourage us to act in a certain manner.” Depending on the outcome of the individuals in Smith’s examples, it is a gentle way
of encouraging a particular reaction to a given situation. For
example, in the section in TMS on the virtue of self-command,
Smith tells the tale of Alexander the Great, who places his trust
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in the wrong people who, after he dies, “divided his empire
among themselves, and after having thus robbed his family
and kindred of their inheritance, put, one after another… to
death” (TMS VI.iii.32). Alexander enjoys being flattered and
in power, and thus due to “excessive self-estimation,” which
Smith cautions against here, ends up destroying his empire and
family (TMS VI.iii.32).
Some authors focus on Smith’s use of examples in WN, but
argue that his main goal is to clarify for the reader important
economic principles or political roadblocks (Fleischacker 2004,
7-26). However, it could be argued that Smith also employs examples in WN to impress moral lessons on the reader as well.
If this is true, it means that not only does Smith use the same
rhetoric style in TMS and WN, but they both additionally
serve the same purpose, which is to cultivate positive, critical
moral judgment in human behavior. Once these moral lessons
are understood, men can then become better moral observers,
and political and economic actors.
Agricultural vs. Mercantile Man
Smith’s characterization of the agricultural and merchant man
best demonstrates the difference seen above between prudence
proper and improper. By looking at these two individuals, it
becomes possible to answer the question: what is the good life
for Smith? Smith is not only concerned about the proper direction of prudence, but also how far that prudence will procure
happiness. Smith’s preference is clearly for the agricultural system, as it allows for the “natural” pattern of growth for a nation, and supports “productive” labor (WN IV.ix.2, 38). Smith
distinguishes productive from unproductive labor as being that
which both replaces initial expenses in establishment and produces additional benefit to society (WN IV.ix.10). Farmers are
most likely to contribute above and beyond replacing capital
expenses, whereas manufacturers are not, thus manufacturing
stock is “unproductive” (WN IV.ix.10). More important than
the economic outcomes of these two systems, are the moral
implications of both. The agricultural system is most likely to
produce a “common character” of “liberality, frankness, and
good fellowship,” whereas the mercantile system breeds “narrowness, meanness, and a selfish disposition, averse to all social pleasure and enjoyment” (WN IV.ix.13). The “system” is
just a reflection of the character of the individual farmers and
merchants, who at their core are fundamentally different. The
agricultural spirit is one of community, honesty, and generosity, whereas the merchant exemplifies the “corporation spirit”
of competition, cunning, and isolation (WN IV.ii.21). Farmers, as they are spread out, are much less likely to collude for
the purposes of establishing a monopoly, and to feel threatened
into fierce competition with another farm leagues away. To the
extent that farmers may begin to act this way is only a conse2014 • The undergraduate Review • 159

quence of the corruptive nature of the “corporation spirit”; “It
was probably in imitation of them, and to put themselves upon
a level with those who, they found, were disposed to oppress
them, that the country gentlemen and farmers of Great Britain
so far forgot the generosity which is natural to their station, as
to demand the exclusive privilege of supplying their countrymen” (WN IV.ii.21).
It is not only the nature of the two industries, but also the
products of that industry which contribute to this stark contrast. Smith explains that as a country’s agricultural abilities
develop, it only takes half the population to supply the entire
subsistence of a nation, while the other half are put to work
“satisfying the other wants and fancies of mankind” (WN
I.xi.c.7). The nature of food is such that the amount desired by
an individual is limited “by the narrow capacity of the human
stomach,” whereas “the desire of the conveniences and ornaments of building, dress, equipage, and household furniture,
seems to have no limit or certain boundary” (WN I.xi.c.7).
The nature of the agriculture business is to supply the equal
necessities of life to those who desire them, thus there really is
no room for extravagant accumulations of profit. In contrast,
as the mercantile business supplies the unequal conveniences
of life to those who desire them, as long as customers who have
the desire to acquire are alive, there is no end to the possible
accumulation of profit. Thus, it is the inherent nature of the
two businesses which makes merchants prone to vanity, greed,
and improper prudence, and farmers prone to saving, industry,
and proper prudence. The same observation is made in TMS:
“In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of
life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself
by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings
are fighting for” (TMS IV.1.10). Men are equal in one respect,
and it is only because they are unequal in a different respect
as a consequence of the perversion of the imagination mentioned above that other objects become desirable. A man may
be a beggar and still be happy if he can fill his belly, but most
men want more than this as they believe more stuff will afford
greater happiness.
The question becomes; which sort of life is most likely to produce happiness? In answer, Smith presents a choice:
Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading
to the attainment of this so much desired object; the
one, by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue;
the other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness.
Two different characters are presented to our emulation; the one, of proud ambition and ostentatious
avidity; the other, of humble modesty and equitable
justice. Two different models, two different pictures,
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are held out to us, according to which we may fashion
our own character and behaviour… (TMS I.iii.3.2).
As stated above, for Smith happiness is tranquility and inner
equilibrium. From how Smith praises the life of the farmer,
it becomes clear this life is the surest means to happiness. The
agricultural man does not inherently have a strong desire for
profit, and thus affords a more peaceful and less restless existence. In addition, the farmer lives in the country, away from
the hustle and bustle of the city. Smith acknowledges that
many men will find the life of the merchant to be most rewarding, but it is only the “studious and careful observer” who
recognizes the merits of the farming life (TMS I.iii.3.2). At this
point, it becomes important to reinforce a point made earlier,
and now confirmed by observation. For Smith, a man’s profession provides the surest means for moral self-actualization.
Nowhere is this clearer than Smith’s praise of the agricultural
man and censure of the mercantile man. A man’s interaction
with the market is thus intrinsically tied to the consequences
to his morality. Additionally, this example demonstrates how
Smith uses his rhetorical style of characterization and situation
to engage the reader’s sense of sympathy in order to proclaim
judgments about economics and morality.
The Mental Yardstick and Political Economy
The mental yardstick is a way to make judgments about the
actions of others and oneself, by looking at what is the perfect
standard, the minimal expectation of action, and aim somewhere in the middle (TMS I.i.5.9, VI.iii.23). If the mental
yardstick is the culmination of Smith’s moral teaching in TMS,
it becomes necessary to demonstrate its presence in WN to
prove Smith is comprehensive and deliberate in his thought
across his texts. Besides using it for personal evaluations, there
is evidence to show that the mental yardstick can be used more
broadly to evaluate entire systems of political economy. Smith
compares the health of the body to that of a system of political
economy. Doctors believe there is a perfect regimen to preserve
a healthy body, however, experience will show that the body
can protect and correct itself on a variety of different regimens
(WN IV.ix.28). The body experiences its own means for self
correction when the perfect regimen cannot be achieved (WN
IV.ix.28). The same phenomena happens in the case of political economy; “…in the political body, the natural effort which
every man is continually making to better his own condition,
is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political economy,
in some degree both partial and oppressive” (WN IV.ix.28).
Politicians and economists, like doctors, strive to achieve some
perfect regimen for political economy; however, “if a nation
would not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty
and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which
BridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

could ever have prospered” (WN IV.ix.28). Just as elements
of the human body work to correct “sloth and intemperance,”
human nature almost always remedies the “folly and injustice
of man” in designing a perfect system (WN IV.ix.28). If then,
the mental yardstick can be applied to find the appropriate political economy, this opens up questions such as: what are the
perfect, mediocre, and worst systems of political economy for
Smith? What are Smith’s views on the organization of political
economy? What, then, can one learn about his views of the
interrelationship between politics, economics, and morality by
employing this tool?
Just as Smith supports the agricultural man over the mercantile
man, so does he feel the same toward those systems of political
economy which personify these characters. There are two ways
in particular in which Smith addresses the advantages of the
agricultural system and disadvantages of the mercantile system.
First, is in regards to how the two societies view wealth. A system managed by merchants views money as wealth, whereas
a system managed by farmers believes “the wealth of nations
[consists], not in the unconsumable riches of money, but in the
consumable goods annually produced by the labor of society”
(WN IV.i.1-2, IV.ix.38). The second difference is the extent of
the overlap between economics and politics. In the mercantile
system, merchants constantly whisper in the ears of politicians.
The political regime becomes a gateway for merchants to perpetuate their own policies for their own advantage, which tend
to work against the public interest (WN IV.i.10, IV.viii.49). In
contrast, the agricultural system has never been known to do
any public harm and represents “perfect liberty as the only effectual expedient for rendering annual reproduction the greatest possible, its doctrine seems to be in every respect as just as
it is generous and liberal” (WN IV.ix.2, IV.ix.38). Despite the
obvious merits of the one system over the other, Smith recognizes that a solid system of political economy requires both
elements and both types of people. The agricultural system is
not sufficient for any meaningful national economic growth
and the mercantile system does provide a means for this growth
by opening new trade. The town and the country rely on each
other. Just as one might employ the mental yardstick to a moral
evaluation, it becomes possible to imagine Smith does the same
with regards to political economy. In a realistic system of political economy, merchants exist; however, to improve upon this
system he suggests a political regime divorced from corporate
influence, which will occasion high economic freedom.
Smith is extremely critical of politicians throughout WN; consequently, in his improved society he assigns a very limited role
to government. He believes it should be primarily concerned
with defense, administration of justice (police and courts), and
“facilitating the commerce of society” (infrastructure) (WN
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IV.ix.51, V.i.c.2). Smith argues that it is from “innumerable
delusions” that politicians attempt to devise economic policy,
for which they are ill equipped (WN IV.ix.51). Politicians do
not rightly understand cause and effect, which Smith seems
to think is fundamental to the study of economics. Only the
establishment of “perfect justice, perfect liberty, and perfect
equality” will bring the “highest degree of prosperity” to all
classes of society (WN IV.ix.17). Allowing for the highest degree of economic freedom, such as freedom of employment,
thus allows for the moral self-actualization as stated previously
in this chapter. It is only in an unregulated market that “every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is
left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and
to bring both his industry and capital into competition with
those of any other man, or order of men” (WN IV.ix.51). This
system of political economy forces men to accept responsibility
for their actions, as they cannot blame it on bad regulations.
Thus, Smith, in characterizing bankruptcy says is it the “most
humiliating calamity” which a man can experience. To make a
modern comparison, Smith would thus not be in favor of bank
bail-outs, as it creates a perverse incentive for businessmen.
Contrarily, it also allows men to enjoy the full approbation and
respect which comes from their prudent decisions. Thus, a system of limited government and full economic liberty leads to
the positive reinforcement of prudence.
Conclusion
By looking at Smith’s vision of political economy, and the arguments made thus far, it now becomes possible to conclude
that Smith supports economic and political structures primarily for moral reasons. This conclusion speaks to the larger concern over how Smith believes politics, economics, and morality function together. It is impossible to come to a definitive
answer without reading Smith’s whole corpus, as stated in the
introduction, but from reading these two texts it becomes clear
Smith places more emphasis on the moral consequences of action. Smith’s view of society could then be synonymous with a
sort of picture frame. The exterior framework would be sympathy and the imagination, which provides the way in which
men establish ideas of morality and virtue. Morality and virtue
would be the “matting” under which politics and economics
are set. Politics and economics are relegated to their own sides
of the interior, but yet experience a lot of overlap in the middle.
If is it true that sympathy and morality provide the foundation of economics and politics for Smith, it then even becomes
possible to assign an ideal reading of Smith. One should thus
begin with TMS and then move to WN and his Lectures on
Jurisprudence. Only in this way can one understand how Smith
believes a society should be structured.
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Although Smith is arguably the “father of modern economics,”
he was nevertheless a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow
University, which means Smith was primarily concerned with
the way in which people make decisions, and the extent to
which they made these decisions based on some predetermined
ideas of morality or ethics. By understanding Smith in this
new light, it is possible he understood people to be making
political and economic decisions through a permanent lens of
morality. Smith would say that one cannot know the effect of
economics and politics until one understands the cause, which
is human moral behavior. Politics and economics do not just
appear from the ground, but are based on decisions individuals
make about their original formations. Whether by design or by
accident, the origin of these political economic systems is individual action, motivated and informed by moral evaluation.
The modern understanding of individual economic behavior
has thus become severed from these ideas. Men are not “homo
economicus,” “rational, calculating, and selfish,” with an “unlimited computational capacity,” who “never makes systematic
mistakes” (Cartwright 2011, 3). For Smith, people are closer to
moral agents, expressing their ideas of morality through action,
and making mistakes along the way. As stated above, Smith is
very wary of creating anything resembling a system, which he
believes is both naive and dangerous. However, this picture of
society does not limit the possibilities of the outcomes. It still
allows for the same flexibility and practicality Smith provides
with his moral theory. With this in mind, it becomes possible
to critique educators who divorce his thought, economists who
ignore his moral teachings, and critics of capitalism.
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Endnotes
1. Smith’s numberings in Wealth of Nations correspond to book, then
chapter, then part, and finally, section.
2. Smith believes there are typically four stages of societal development: the first is the age of hunter-gatherers, the second is the age of
shepherds, the third is the age of agriculture, and the last is the age of
commercial society (Lieberman 2006, 225-226).
3. Parallels can actually be drawn between Smith’s style of rhetoric
and Aristotle’s, as they try and achieve similar goals of accessibility
and flexibility (Hanley 2009, 86-91).
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